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NOMENCLATURE
x Optimal time for defender to start the transmission
 y Optimal time for the attacker to intrude
d Network delay set by the network designer
wt Waiting time
T Session time
v Expected value of the game
H(x) Probability for the defender player to transmit at time x
P(y) Probability of intrusion time y by the attacker player
IA(x) Step function for choosing a random point x on line 
interval
1.  INTRODUCTION
Military Ad-Hoc networks, Sensor and Sensor/Actuator 
networks and a typical media networks are a class of challenged 
networks that arise as a result of time delays, various forms 
of host-router mobility and frequent network disconnections 
due to power management and interference1. With increasing 
reliance of military and civilian applications on wireless sensor 
networks, makes these networks vulnerable to intermittent 
network connections and transmission delays. However, the 
widely used internet protocols may not be applicable to networks 
characterised by long delay and inconsistent connectivity2,3. 
Such networks require protocols that consider connectivity, 
time delays, reliability and quality of service. Delay tolerant 
network (DTN) paradigm serves as a means for such networks 
and regions with mismatched time delays4,5. The possibility of 
resource scarcity in DTNs make them vulnerable to various 
cyber-attacks, including interference attacks, typically referred 
to as jamming6,7. In the simplest form, jamming is a denial 
of service attack, considering the role of an adversary, which 
blocks legitimate communications by flooding the network 
with jamming waveforms and pulses. In this paper, we focus 
on the transmitter-receiver pair and jammers that learn the 
transmission pattern of the network users and frame their 
jamming strategies so as to intensify the damage in a delay 
tolerant wireless network. We study the conflict between the 
defender (transmitter-receiver pair) and the attacker (jammer) 
in wireless networks that is used to provide delay tolerant 
internet connectivity. Though security systems are designed 
against the attacks of the highly skilled adversaries, they 
are vulnerable to cyber threats. A game theoretic model to 
study the conflict between the transmitter-receiver pair and 
jammer in a jamming scenario is proposed. Although ad-hoc 
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security solutions like cryptography have been traditionally 
used to protect the confidentiality of the information based on 
encryption, the knowledge of transmission period can divulge 
critical and decisive information of the data flow. Owing to 
this insecure medium of communication, security decisions 
are investigated analytically using game theoretic models 
that capture the adversarial nature in jamming scenario. We 
consider a delay-tolerant sparse network in which a source (set 
of transmitters) transmits data through the intermediate nodes 
in the communication range to the destination (receivers). This 
is done with an aim of achieving successful transmission of the 
data to the destination (receiver) within a prescribed deadline; 
however these transmissions are subject to intervention from 
jammers. We model the two adversary players: the attacker 
and the defender with conflicting objective as the probability 
of transmission at each time instant. Transmission at a time  
t is considered successful when the transmitter attempts 
transmission in the absence of any intrusion (when the jammer 
is silent). We design transmission strategies for the transmitter 
that offset the transmission period based interference of 
network traffic by jammers. We model and analyse the decision 
making processes and interactions between the jammer and the 
transmitter as a game where the strategy of the transmitter is to 
choose an optimal time to schedule his transmission before his 
session expires. Conversely, the goal of a jammer is to frame 
optimal strategies to intensify the damage of the transmission 
pattern. We deduce a solution for this game, using a probability 
distribution function over finite number of strategies for both 
the players to compute their expected payoff. The scenarios 
in which players are considered to have perfect or imperfect 
information are studied using entropy based measure
We design a simulation test-bed using Matlab, and create 
several scenarios in which the players are considered to have 
perfect/imperfect information using entropy based measures. 
We then compute the expected payoff and the 
resulting equilibrium values. These results are 
used to strategically evaluate the optimal time 
for the players, and evaluate the efficiency of 
the strategies used by the transmitters against 
jammer attacks. The proposed methodology is 
illustrated using several cases.
2.  BACKGROUND STUDIES
Several researchers have studied the 
application of game theoretic frameworks for 
solving security related jamming problems in 
wireless networks with delay tolerance capability. 
Jamming attacks have been considered in DTNs 
with its impact on the performance and network 
operations. Kuriakose and Daniel8 propose an 
intrusion detection scheme to monitor the DTN 
environment for flooding attacks. A table based 
strategy is proposed by Saha9 to record the 
network behaviour and eliminate those nodes 
detected as malicious. Many analytical tools such 
as decision theory, machine learning, pattern 
recognition, and control theory have been used 
to scrutinise and model the decision making 
problems in security. Amongst these, game theoretic models 
seem very effective in assessing and capturing the nature of 
adversaries, typically classified in the military domain as Red-
Teaming strategies. Since game-theoretic methods stand out 
for their obstinacy, they have a striking virtue to anticipate 
and design defense against a sophisticated attacker, rather than 
responding randomly to a specific attack10,11. Alain12 provides 
a detailed report in which game theoretic models are used to 
investigate cyber-defence scenarios, while Alpcan and Basar13 
discusses a comprehensive game theoretical structure that 
models the interaction between the two opposing players. 
Zhu14,15 uses game theoretic techniques to analyse the complex 
decision making processes and interactions between the players. 
The surveys16,17 provide a structured and a comprehensive 
overview of research on the current status of this new field in 
various research contexts.
Altman and Basar18 considers the application of game 
theory to multi-attribute decision  problem that arises in a delay 
tolerant network. Benromarn and Komolkiti19 propose a game 
theoretic framework for solving jamming in a delay tolerant 
wireless mesh network. Azouzi20 discusses the application 
of game models to route control in DTN in order to achieve 
successful and timely delivery of message to the destination 
with a high probability. 
3.  PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Consider a delay tolerant network modelled as a graph 
of  n mobile relay nodes with a low degree of connectivity. 
The network serves as a gateway that enables communication 
scenario between the transmitter and receiver nodes, while a 
Jammer j aims at disrupting their communication intermittently 
Fig. 1. 
The network transmitters (defender) and jammers 
(attacker) have conflicting interests; where the former aims 
Figure 1. Jamming scenario in a DTN.
284
DEF. SCI. J., VOl. 67, NO. 3, MAy 2017
to maximise the probability of successful transmission while 
safeguarding the secrecy while the latter aims to minimise it. 
Transmission at a time  is considered successful only when 
the network user attempts transmission in the absence of any 
intrusion.
Strategies: The strategy for the defender is the choice of 
an appropriate time X to schedule his transmission. Since we 
have considered a delay tolerant network here, we regard the 
network delay as the waiting time wt of the packets at each 
intermediate node (relay), where 0 X T d≤ ≤ − . Similarly 
the strategy for the attacker is an appropriate time Y for the 
intrusion, where    0 Y T≤ ≤ .
Payoff: As stated above, the transmission at a time X is 
successful only when the defender attempts transmission in the 
absence of jamming. The payoff to the defender player be will 
be assigned 1 if he transmits the packet before the session time 
T in the absence of any network intrusions and 0 otherwise. 
Each player chooses a strategy from a finite set of strategies 
represented by a point on the closed interval [0,1]. let
t
dw
T
= , Xx
T
=  and Yy
T
= . 
This signifies that defender chooses a strategy x from 
a given set of strategies which range over the interval [0,1]. 
The choices of x  and y (optimal time for defender to start the 
transmission and optimal time for the attacker to intrude), 
determines a play of the game, whose outcomes are measured 
by the payoff function U(x,y) which is given by
[ 1 ]
1,
( , )
[ 1]
0,
t
t
y x w
If or
U x y
x w y
If x y
 ≤ ≤ −  
  
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This can be solved by using probability distribution func-
tion over finite number of strategies. A mixed strategy for a 
player i is a probability distribution over his pure strategies. 
This notion of mixed strategies for finite games can be further 
generalised. Suppose the strategy set for player i is finite, then 
the mixed strategy is a finite distribution over Y. This is a dis-
tribution that gives a probability value to a finite set of pure 
strategies. So let Yi = {yi1 , yi2 , ..., yim} be player i‘s finite set 
of points along with the probabilities summing to one. This 
is done with the understanding that mixed strategy for player 
i is chosen with the probability such that, qi = {q1(yi1), q2(yi2), 
... , qn(yim)} which is the probability over Yi , where qi (yi ) is the 
probability that player plays Yi  Thus probability distribution 
over a finite set of points Yi  is expressed as, 
( ) 1
i i
i i
y Y
q y
∈
=∑                                                                  (2) 
This signifies the sum of qi(yi) over all the i iy Y∈   so let us 
denote the set of finite distributions on Y  by Y*(i).
let H(x) be the probability distribution functions for the 
defender player to transmit at time x and P(y) be the probability 
of intrusion time y by the attacker player. Thus the expected 
payoff to the defender is as follows:
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This can be written in the following form
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The given function F(x) is continuous in the interval  [0, 1-wt]  Thus for the given interval, let the maximum occur at a . 
Then, 
( ) ( )min
x
F x F a=                                                           
(6)
Thus, 
( ) ( ) ( )
0 1
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t
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P x w P x P a
≤ ≤ −
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Hence,
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Hence, for all the values of x, which is iterated from 0 to 
(n-1)wt (i.e., ( )0 1 ti to n w→ − ), we obtain ( ) ( )tP nw P na≥ , 
where ( )1 1t tnw n w≤ ≤ + . This implies n = 1/wt and it can 
attain maximum at 1/wt. Therefore we have ( ) 1/P a n≤ , 
which follows
 ( ) ( )0 1 1  max min t tx wy P x w P x n≤ ≤ − + − ≤                               (9)
Now, suppose 1/wt is an integer or nwt = 1. Then consider 
the distribution function P(y) = y , where we have,
 
( ) ( ) ( ), max min
1
txy
E H y P x w P x
n
= + −  
=                     (10)
If 1/wt is a non integer, we use step function to assist 
us in computing the distribution function which is generally 
written as    
( ) ( )
0
i
n
i
i AF x a Z x
=
= ∑                                                      (11)
where 0n ≥ , ia → real nos. and iA → Intervals.
Now let us write 
iA
Z  as IA
 
which is an indicator function 
of A such that, 
( ) 1,
0,A
If x A
I x
Otherwise
∈ =  
                                     
   (12) 
Thus the distribution function is given by,
( ) ( ) ( ),
i ni x n x
F x a I x a I x= ………                                (13)
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where 11, 0i i ia x x +∑ → ≤ ≤   
Here we make use of the step function for choosing a point 
at random on a line interval. Now consider the distribution 
function 
 ( ) ( )
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→
+ intervals.
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Since we have,        
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This game has a value, which is given by 
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1
t
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Thus, an optimal strategy for the defender is given by
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Similarly, an optimal strategy for the attacker is given by
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For the defender player we can also further verify that  
H* is optimal for which again the following two cases will be 
considered where (i) nwt = 1 and (ii) nwt is a non integer. Now 
suppose 1 1  ort
t
w
n w
=  is an integer, then according to Eqn. (4) 
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On converting all the values in terms of the original 
parameters, the solution of the game is:
(i) Value of the game
11v
T
d
= −
 
  
                                                                  (28)
(ii) Defender’s optimal strategy 
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(iii) Attacker’s optimal strategy
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To summarise, the jamming attack is modelled as follows: 
Initially, the defender player choses a strategy X from the 
given set of strategies to schedule the transmission. Similarly 
the strategy for the attacker is an appropriate time Y for the 
intrusion. The choices of X and Y determine the outcome of the 
game given as the payoff function Eqn. (1). Next the value of 
the game is deduced Eqn. (28) and the optimal strategies for 
the respective players is given by the probability distribution 
functions H(x) and P(y) respectively Eqns. (29)-(30). The 
proposed algorithm is summarised in (Algorithm 1).
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Figure 2.  Expected payoff of the defender.
Algorithm 1. Transmitter jammer game
1     d ←   network delay
2      T ←    network session time; 
3     X ←  defender’s choice of time to schedule his transmission;     
4     Y ←   attacker’s choice of time for intrusion           
5     v ←   value of the game;
6     ( )H x ← defender’s probability distribution function to transmit 
                   at time x;
7    ( )P y ←  attacker’s probability distribution function to intrude 
                      at time y; 
8      Initialise the expected payoffs
9      while ( 1 || 1)t ty x w x w y≤ ≤ − + ≤ ≤  do
10    for x A∈  do
11    ( ) 1AI x = ;
12    end for
13    for [0,1 ]tx w∈ − do
14    v ←  value of the game
15    ( )H x ←  Defender’s payoff  
16    ( )P y ←  Attacker’s payoff      
17    end for
18    end while
4. SIMULATION SETUP
We design a simulation test-bed using Matlab, and create 
several scenarios in which the players are considered to have 
perfect/imperfect information and compute the expected 
payoff and resulting equilibrium values. The cases of perfect /
imperfect information of the players are further studied using 
entropy based measures.
4.1 Time Delay – Known or Unknown
In delay tolerant networks, if the employed crypto 
technique, senses any network intrusions, it eventually delays 
the network traffic (communication of the normal user) by 
buffering it for d = 1, 2, ... , T , which is a design parameter 
that is set in advance. In practice, any crypto tool requires 
introducing a short delay in to the system, whose value is set 
by the network designer. 
Case 1: Fixed time delay and known
For illustration purpose, let us assume the delay value set 
by the network designer is 2 s (assumed to be fixed 
and known). Then the expected payoff to the defender 
is 0.034  with the probability 0.2. This is depicted in 
Fig. 2, where the expected payoff of the defender 
is shown as the probability function (assumed to 
be uniformly distributed) for choosing a strategy x 
from the given set of strategies which range over the 
interval [0,1] by a random process H. The choices 
of x, determine the play of the game. Any changes 
(increase or decrease) in delay has a direct influence 
on the waiting time (i.e., delay is directly proportional 
to the waiting time).
Case 2: Uniformly random time delay and Unknown
A more realistic game is one where the delay is randomly 
chosen by the employed crypto technique. In such a dynamic 
situation, the delay value is subjected to variation at each time 
iteration of the network session T as portrayed in Fig. 3.
In practice, the players may start with all the strategies 
having equally likely probability of usage (a uniform 
distribution), however, over time, the players will have different 
probability distributions for the selection of strategies. This 
signifies different probabilities of attack/defend success or 
failure for various possible complex combinations of player’s 
actions to obtain effective strategies.
As can be inferred, the strategy for the defender player is 
the choice of time x  to schedule his transmission. likewise, the 
strategy for the attacker player is the choice of time y to intrude 
the transmission. The phenomenon that we observe in Fig 4. 
portrays H(x) and P(y)  (probability distribution functions for 
the defender and attacker players respectively), used to obtain 
the optimal time of play for both the players. 
Case 3: Time delay is Non-uniformly Random and 
Unknown
let us assume the case where the players choose the 
strategies using non uniform probability distribution. In this 
scenario, the delay value is subjected to non homogeneous 
variations at each time  iteration of the network session T as 
portrayed in Fig 5. 
4.2 Entropy based Information about the Adversary
Expected payoff is computed by choosing a strategy x from 
the given set of strategies over the interval [0,1], using uniform 
probability distribution function. The uniform distribution is 
the maximum entropy distribution of any interval [a,b].
Then the probability distribution function on {x1,x2, 
... ,xn } with maximum entropy
21 turns out to be the one 
that corresponds to the least certainty of {x1,x2, ... ,xn }.The 
probability distribution functions on {x1,x2, ... ,xn } is the set 
of positive real numbers p1,..., pn that sum up to 1. Entropy 
is a continuous function of n-tuples {p1,p2, ... ,pn } where the 
entropy is maximised at  1 1 1{ , , , }
m m m

 .
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Figure 4. Optimal strategies for the players.
Figure 3. Dynamically varying delay value - uniformly random.
Figure 5. Dynamically varying delay value - non uniformly random.
Minimum entropy occurs when the player anticipates 
about his opponent's moves accurately. In this case, one 
strategy among the prescribed strategy set is selected with 
probability 1 and the rest are set to 0's. If the player is uncertain 
about his opponent's moves then all the strategies xi  are picked 
with equal probability 1
m
 resulting in maximum entropy. Now 
let  p(x) and q(x) be continuous probability functions over the 
interval [0,1] and p(x) = q(x) x∀  . Then let p be any probability 
distribution function on {x1,x2, ... ,xn } with pi = p(x) letting
 1 ,iq im
= ∀  
1 1
log log log log log log
m m
i i
i i
ip q p m m
= =
− = =∑ ∑  
which is the entropy of q. 
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Case 1: Player has a priori information about 
opponent
We start with the case where the players are provided with 
either imperfect information or perfect information of their 
opponents. If the defender’s initial strategy is 0, it signifies that 
he has zero knowledge of his opponent, while 1 signifies that 
the defender has perfect knowledge of the attacker. As can be 
seen from the Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), the attacker starting with the 
probability 1 and the defender with probability 0, intercept at 
a point to produce the saddle point of 0.51 for the game. In the 
next scenario, we try to change the initial condition for both 
the players and arrive at the same saddle point approximately. 
Thus the game played is a fair game. 
Figure 7. Attacker starting with probability 0.5 and defender 
with 0 - saddle point 0.41.
Figure 6. (a) Attacker starting with probability 1 and defender 
with 0 - saddle point 0.51 (b) Attacker starting with 
probability 0 and defender with 1 - saddle point 
0.47.
(a)
(b)
When the player has imperfect information about his 
opponent’s moves, then the probabilities on his strategy 
set have equal values of 1/m with maximum entropy. If the 
number of strategies prescribed to the respective is player is 
10, then the entropy value computed as log(m) is given as 1. 
Now let us assume that the player has a perfect information 
about his opponent’s moves. Then he is certain about 
information he will get by choosing each strategy from the 
strategy set.  To illustrate, for the set X = { x1, x2, ..., x10 }, the 
probability of random selection of each strategy  is given by 
4 7 8 1 4 4 6 1 1 7{ , , , , , , , , , }
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
S = In this illustration there 
are five different outcomes when each strategy is selected. 
For which the entropy equals 1.92. This signifies, each time a 
strategy is chosen from the given set, the amount of information 
obtained is 1.92  with minimum entropy.
Now letting one player be informed of his opponent’s 
actions, yield optimal solutions, depicted in Fig. 7, which 
are different from those obtained from the game discussed in 
previous case.
Case 2: No a priori information of adversary
In general, if the players lack information, then it is 
more natural for them to fear the worst from the opponents 
and reach suboptimal solution. If initial delay is random then 
suboptimal cases may arise. The initial time delay set by the 
network user should not be known to the attacker. If by some 
means, he knows the delay then the probability of intrusions 
are maximum. If the network is free from attack, the defender 
can choose any strategy with confidence. If the network is not 
free from attack, initially due to attacker’s actions the defender 
cannot succeed.
5.  CONCLUSIONS
Analysed game-theoretic techniques to model the decision 
making processes and interactions between the jammer and the 
transmitters in a delay tolerant network. We obtain a solution 
for this game, by using probability distribution function over 
finite number of strategies for both the players to compute their 
expected payoff. Using simulation techniques, we compute 
the expected payoff along with the resulting equilibrium. The 
results are further analysed and discussed for various cases 
using entropy based measures. These results can be used to 
strategically decide on the optimal time for both the players.
The game is modelled such that the actions of both the 
players, i.e., is the probabilities of transmission and jamming 
H(x) and P(y) respectively and the network size remain 
constant over time. In a dynamic model, where the actions of 
the players that may change in time is dependent on the value 
of the network state. This is attempted as a future research 
work, where we consider ‘mean fixed game theory’ for large 
number of nodes. 
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